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"Growing construction costs and concern for environmental quality have
made more difficult the new water supply development designed to meet
the projected water deficit. "t
I. INTRODUCTION
This quote could have been written yesterday. But such were the concerns
facing the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law as it
sought to improve California's water rights law following a short but severe
drought in 1978. The State acknowledged that it was facing substantial existing
and projected unmet water supply needs in various regions of California.2 Many
of these shortage conditions still persist today.3 In 1978, as today, most of the
state's unmet water requirements were linked to the need to augment existing
supplies and meet the demands of California's relentless burgeoning economic
and population growth. At times, the problem is more a function of the
hydrologic and economic reality that the expected areas for new demand do not
match the point of origin for the available supplies. However, the bar has been
raised higher and new water is also required to offset losses of supply that have
been impaired by contamination, 4 reclaimed for use by the environment, 5 and the
application of Federal law.
6
1. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 51 (1978)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. See id. at 1 (stating that "[bly the year 2000 the state's net demand for water may considerably exceed
net dependable supply").
3. See DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 1998, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES 1-2
(Bulletin 160-98) (estimating "that California's water shortages at a 1995 level of development are 1.6 maf in
average water years, and 5.1 maf in drought years"); Drought Update Indicates Fifth Consecutive Year of
Drought: Drought Conditions in West, WATER STRATEGIST, at 10 (May 2004) (stating that "Lake Powell is
expected to receive 50 percent of normal spring inflow, and the Lake was at 42 percent of live capacity in
Spring 2004"); Sue McClurg & Glenn Totten, The Ties that Bind: The Evolving Policy of the Colorado River,
WESTERN WATER, at 4, 10 (March/Apr. 2004) (quoting Reclamation Commissioner John Keyes as saying "[w]e
are on the cusp of one of the most severe droughts on record... this drought is even worse than the Dust Bowl
years during the 1930's").
4. See Gary Pitzer, Confronting a Legacy of Contamination: Perchlorate, WESTERN WATER, at 4-13
(May/June 2003) (exploring the threat of perchlorate contamination in California). Presently pending cases
seeking to address perchlorate contamination include Southern California Water Co. v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., No.
CV 02-6340 ABC (RCx) (C.D. Cal.) and American States Water Co. v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., No. 99 AS 05947
(Super. Ct. Sacramento County).
5. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 714-15 (Cal. 1983); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1989); United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227
Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986); Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) Reclamation Projects
Authorization and Adjustments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575 § 3406(b)(2), 106 Stat. 4600, 4715-4716
(1992).
6. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region: The Law of the River, at http://www.usbr.
gov/lc/region/gl000/lawofrvr.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustments Act of
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The Final Report of the Commission and the legislation enacted in
furtherance of its recommendations made it the official position of the State of
California to encourage water transfers as a means of more efficient statewide
water use.7 In short, the Governor's Commission believed that relatively simple
and focused reforms in water law could effectuate a more efficient water use and
thereby serve to reduce the projected deficit in water supplies.8 Specifically, the
failure to address the conditions necessary to encourage investment in improved
water use efficiency would ultimately lead to the widening of the gap between
supply and demand, substantial economic waste, and the failure to reach our
State's economic potential. Accordingly, the Final Report of the Governor's
Commission considered two primary pathways to increase water use efficiency:
first, through more extensive administrative regulation of water use; and second,
through the creation of market-based incentives that would result from legislative
and judicial support for water transfers.
9
Just five years earlier, the National Water Commission had recommended
legislative intervention to provide direction through the adoption of legislatively
defined standards for reasonable and beneficial use within a specific region.' ° While
the Governor's Commission failed to endorse this specific recommendation, it did elect
to advocate some modest changes in broadening the standard for demonstrating
beneficial use" and buttressing the California State Water Resources Control Board's
("SWRCB") regulatory oversight of water use by extending its administrative authority
to issue cease and desist orders and to pursue civil penalties.12
The strongest recommendations, however, were directed toward the creation
of a climate for more extensive investments in conservation and for facilitating
water markets. 13 Indeed, without an active water market, which offers a realistic
hope to those thirsty users seeking an orderly redistribution of existing water
supplies, the more populated and often more desperate regions of the State are
likely to pursue other options. 14 Actual experience in the hunt to augment
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575 § 3406(b)(2), 106 Stat. 4600, 4715-4716 (1992); WATER EDUC. FOUND.,
LAYPERSON'S GUIDE TO THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT 14 (2002) (noting that the CVPIA "reallocated
800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield (600,000 acre-feet in a dry year) to restore valley fisheries").
7. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 380-387,475 (West Supp. 2005); see also id. §§ 1810-1814.
8. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
9. See id. at 57-69.
10. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 305 (1973).
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 71 (recommending a modification of the custom, standard, and habit
criteria to serve as merely one factor in making the determination of whether a given use was beneficial).
12. Id. at 59.
13. Id. at 60-62.
14. David E. Lindgren, The Colorado River: Are New Approaches Possible Now that the Reality of Our
Allocation is Here?, 38 ROCKY MTN. MIN L. INST. 25-1, 25-3 (1992); see ROBERT GOTTLIEB & MARGARET
FITZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH: WATER AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA 79-80, 84-
85 (1991); see also LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE WATER BUSINESS: UNDERSTANDING THE WATER SUPPLY
AND WASTEWATER INDUSTRY 245 (1998).
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available supplies has merely reaffirmed the need for water transfers and further
serves to provide additional impetus to break down the remaining barriers to a
fully developed water market. 15
As was the case in 1978, water transfers continue to occur regularly and
routinely on a regional or local level. However, if the people of California intend
to simultaneously meet future water supply demands and manage water resources
on a sustainable basis, then substantial progress must be made in the area of
securing access to publicly owned conveyance facilities, frequently called
"wheeling,"'16 and in creating an orderly process to measure and consider third-
party impacts so as to improve local support for inter-regional transfers.
17
HI. THE BUYER'S OPTIONS
Since 1978, other than water transfers, the three options most frequently
pursued by potential buyers seeking to bridge the gap between supply and
demand estimates have been: (a) demand management; (b) new water supply
development; and (c) utilitarian reallocation. Each approach has enjoyed some
modest success in the years following the Commission Report, but water
transfers continue to hold the greatest promise.
A. Demand Management
Some areas of the State have undertaken dramatic water conservation
programs and maximized the use of recycled water in a variety of settings.
Continuing legislative efforts have focused on creating incentives for and even
requiring various forms of conservation, and California's urban water purveyors
have adopted and pursued best management practices. There are probably a
number of reasons why conservation successes have substantially dampened new
15. "The application of market forces can be an effective way to achieve a balance between supply and
demand, to facilitate efficiency by disclosing non-competitive and inefficient water users and to stimulate use of
technical and procedural innovations to maximize water use efficiency." WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP,
WATER TRANSFER ISSUES IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES
CONTROL BOARD 6 (June 2002); see also David H. Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can't We Get it Right the
First Time, 34 ENvTL. L. 1, 12-14 (2004).
16. During the first year of operation, the Environmental Water Account ("EWA") obtained 264,000
acre-feet from transfers. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 5. The State Water Bank was
established in 1991, and in that year, purchased rights to use 821,000 acre-feet of water from willing suppliers
to sell to entities with critical needs. Id. at 4. Access to pumping plants in the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta and
canal capacities are major factors in accomplishing water transfers from the northern portions of the Central and
Southern areas of California. Id.
17. See Ellen Hanak & Caitlin Dyckman, Counties Wresting Control: Local Responses to California's
Statewide Water Market, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 490 (2003). The legitimacy of community impacts is open
to debate. See Charles V. Moore, Discussion, in WATER SCARCITY: IMPACTS ON WESTERN AGRICULTURE 266,
268-269 (Ernest A. Englebert & Ann Foley Scheuring, eds., 1984).
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demands in metropolitan areas,'8 and further progress is clearly still possible.19
However, there are limits to what can be accomplished through conservation.2°
From time to time, there have been more extreme local efforts to legally preclude
the creation of new demands, rather than seek a more efficient distribution of
resources. In the early 1970s, the support for better demand management converged
with a growing public sentiment that urban sprawl should be controlled through
prohibition of the extension of utility services. Almost overnight, demand manage-
ment was transformed into a strategy for effectuating growth control.2'
18. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power installed water meters early in the twentieth
century, and has encouraged the installation of both low-flow showerheads and ultra-low-flush toilets. See Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, Water Past and Present: Conservation Efforts, at http:f/www.
ladwp.comladwp/cmsladwpOO1627.jsp (last visited Oct. 17, 1004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California has both residential and commercial rebate
and incentive programs in order to encourage conservation, and additionally has programs regarding water-wise
landscaping and the watering of lawns and gardens. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,
Conservation and the Environment, at http://www.mwdh2o.conmwdh2o/pages/conserv/conservOl.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Estimates suggest that extensive
conservation could supply water for a million people. See Getches, supra note 15, at 13-14. The Santa Clara
Valley Water District has different programs to foster water conservation in homes, landscaping, business, and
agriculture. See Santa Clara Valley Water District, Water Conservation, at http://www.valleywater.org/Water/
Water conservationlindex.shtm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The
San Diego County Water Authority invests more than $1 million each year in conservation programs including
the installation of water-saving fixtures and appliances, as well as residential surveys, landscape, and
agricultural audits. San Diego County Water Authority, Water Conservation: A Way of Life in San Diego
County (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.sdcwa.orglmanage/pdf/ConservationlO_03.pdf (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
19. Barton Thompson, Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671,700,755-
56; 759-60 (1993). The California Water Code also now mandates that recycled water be used when available in
certain situations. See CAL WATER CODE § 13553(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 2005) (use of potable water for toilet
flushing when recycled water is available is a waste under Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution); id. §
13550 (the use of potable domestic water for nonpotable uses, including cemeteries, golf courses, parks, highway
landscaped areas, and industrial and irrigation uses is a waste or an unreasonable use of the water within the meaning of
Article X, Section 2, if recycled water is available); Getches, supra note 15, at 14.
20. "Despite SDCWA's tremendous successes in maximizing existing water supplies through water
conservation and BMPs, these measures alone are not sufficient to supply projected new demand over the next
twenty years. Anticipated population growth in the San Diego County region, and thus increased demand, will
require additional water resources/supplies." Expert Witness Statement of Kenneth Weinberg, In re Petition of
Imperial Irrigation District and San Diego County Water Authority for Approval of Long-Term Transfer of
Conserved Water and Changes in Point of Diversion, Place of Use and Purpose of Use Under Permit No. 7643,
at 8 (SWRCB, Mar. 22, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. Many local agencies adopted water shortage emergency declarations. Moratoria preventing the
issuance of new urban water connections were used to defer, and in some cases deny, new development in vast
portions of the State's Central Coast region. A decade later and following a plethora of unsuccessful legal
challenges, the moratoriums remained in existence. The cases reviewing the moratoria have accepted broader
notions of what constitutes an "emergency." No longer can an emergency be considered a temporary, sudden, or
unexpected condition. Rather, emergency had become a semi-permanent condition and a matter of political
choice. Ultimately, this experiment in demand management ended when the catastrophic economic
consequences of prolonged drought in the early 1990s turned the tide. See Swanson v. Main Mun. Water Dist.,
128 Cal. Rptr. 485 (Ct. App. 1976); Hollister Park Inv. Co. v. Goleta Water Dist., 147 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Ct. App.
1978); Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (Ct. App. 1991); Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Hidden Valley
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Today, virtually all of the water shortage emergency measures adopted between
1973 and 1980 have now been repealed, and the theory that communities could
control growth by overriding real demands has been largely discredited.22 The
process now appears to have come full circle, with the requirements for new and
reliable water being a necessary prerequisite to the approval of large development.
Local agencies are required to make findings regarding the adequacy of their
available water as a precondition to the issuance of land use clearance.2 3 At the same
time, local agencies have continued to squeeze existing users more tightly to foster
and compel conservation. 4 If sustainable development is the model and new water is
necessary, it will likely have to come from either new projects or water transfers.
B. New Projects
A second approach to secure additional water and one that dominated the
early development of water supplies in the West,2 5 and still frequently considered
by water shortage areas, is the development of new water supplies through a
combination of physical projects such as off-stream storage and desalination.
However, water supply projects remain controversial and typically very costly.2 6
Mun. Water Dist., 63 Cal. Rptr 889 (Ct. App. 1967); Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 625 (Ct. App. 1991). But see Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1990).
22. The economic losses attributed to the drought in 1989-1992 were enormous. See generally State
Water Resources Control Board, Hearings Program-Cachuma Project Hearing, at http://www.waterrights.ca.
gov/hearingslcachumahearing.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(Hearing to Review the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Water Right Permits 11308 and 11310 (Application 11331
and 11332) to determine whether any modifications in permit terms or conditions are necessary to protect public
trust values and downstream water rights on the Santa Ynez River below Bradbury Dam (Cachuma Reservoir)).
Water connection moratoriums of the Goleta Water District, the City of Santa Barbara, the Summerland County
Water District, the Montecito Water District, and the Main Municipal Water District were all repealed in the
early 1990s. See also Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the failure to provide
service connections to new users may constitute a takings and a violation of substantive due process). However,
a quasi-moratorium on service connections in the Monterey Peninsula remains in existence today and is
administered by the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District. See CAL. WATER CODE app. § 118-363
(stating that no person shall create a water distribution system within the Monterey Peninsula Water
Management District without district approval).
23. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10915 (West Supp. 2005); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65867.5, 66455.3,
66473.7 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005); see also Stanislaus Nat'l Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 625 (Ct. App. 1996) (environmental impact report must present full analysis of water supplies even for
planned projects); County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66 (Ct. App. 1999)
(failure to analyze growth inducing impacts of new storage facilities).
24. See CAL. WATER CODE § 526 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring the installation of water meters for all
urban water suppliers receiving water from the Central Valley Project); A.B. 2572, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 884
(requiring all urban water suppliers to begin the installation of water meters).
25. See WATER EDUC. FOUND., LAYPERSON'S GUIDE TO THE STATE WATER PROJECT 17 (2004). The
State Water Project ("SWP") represents one of the largest infrastructure investments ever and is the largest
state-built multi-purpose water projects in the U.S.. Id. at 10.
26. See id. at 23; Getches, supra note 15, at 14. CALFED is under a 30-year schedule to implement
long-term water storage and conveyance so as to provide a reliable water supply. WATER EDUCATION
FOUNDATION, supra note 25, at 23.
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Despite some limited breakthroughs, like the $2.1 billion dollar East-Side
Diamond Valley Lake water storage project recently completed by the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ("MWD"), the prospects for
further off-stream storage facilities appear dim. 27 Storage projects are fiercely
contested by environmental interests and the expenses associated with permitting
and building reservoirs are often so substantial so as to preclude or at least
dissuade actual construction.28
Even desalination of ocean and brackish water has its share of detractors.29
While there is nothing inherently wrong with the support of a proper mix of
water supply development projects, public stewardship, economic efficiency, and
environmental responsibility, the public deserves a relatively complete and
transparent analysis of water supply options.3 °
C. Utilitarian Reallocation
A third approach often pursued to obtain additional water supplies has been
to mount a direct assault against the legal basis for the priority of the rights
enjoyed by existing users."1 By seeking a reallocation of water through the
application of legal theories, such as the doctrine of equitable apportionment or
by asserting that the law requires not just beneficial but optimal use,32 junior
priority rights hope to secure water presently enjoyed by existing users without
compensation.
33
27. See Molly Dugan & Han Kwak, Anglers Find a Jewel: Diamond Valley Lake Rewards Patience with
Catches, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Oct. 4, 2003), available at http://www.pe.com/digitalextra/metro/diamondvalley/
vt_stories/PE_NEWSnlake04.a124c.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
28. Thompson, supra note 19, at 676, 702. "As environmental opposition, tight budgets, and a reduced
number of remaining sites have reduced the opportunity for engineering solutions, a growing number of cities
have also recognized that water trades may be one of the few realistic means available to meet their increasing
demands." Id. at 702 n.109.
29. For a critique on the issues and concerns associated with desalination projects, see CAL. COASTAL
COMM'N, SEAWATER DESALINATION AND THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT (March 2004).
30. "Hidden water subsidies, however, produce other 'hidden' taxes, such as tax dollars needed to pay
for extremely expensive water reclamation projects. Many governments are finding that this may not be the
most cost-effective use of the natural resource." Getches, supra note 15, at 14. "The physical and political
circumstances are such that big government can no longer build more dams or canals to help with water
shortages." Id. at 250.
31. Clifford W. Shulz & Gregory S. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards Property Rights in
California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocation, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031, 1064 (1988).
32. Compare Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 260-61 (Ct.
App. 1990) with Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Ct. App. 1989)
(questioning whether Article X, Section 2 requires reasonable use or optimal use).
33. See Lindgren, supra note 14, at 25-3; GoTrLIEB & FITZSIMMONS, supra note 14, at 79-80, 84-85.
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While it may be true that water is a public resource, 34 there is nothing
incompatible with protection of the public interest in water supply development
and the recognition of private property rights in water.35 Since 1978, the desire to
protect and secure water for environmental values was partially addressed
through the recognition and application of the public trust doctrine.36 Likewise,
the safe annual yield of a groundwater basin places a legal limit on the quantity
of groundwater that may be harvested annually.
37
Efforts to reclaim water from consumptive uses as part of an environmental
baseline can be reasonably accommodated within an evaluation of water
availability. However, consumptive users with junior water rights have sought to
pursue another strategy-one that is not focused on identifying the resource
baseline but on challenging the very rules of priority by offering instead
allocation criteria that is "needs" based under the guise of promoting "optimal
use."
The strategy of socialized redistribution of water is rationalized by rhetoric
that because water rights are a "public resource" and not private property, water
may be distributed in accordance with modem visions of public need in lieu of
property rights. There are many problems in an allocation strategy that seeks to
cast aside the certainty provided by property rights in favor of transcendent use,
not the least of which is endless litigation and legislation to establish the highest
"need" of the "public resource." The greatest irony is that those that propose
uncompensated redistribution in the name of optimal use do so at the risk of
discouraging further investments in conservation and thereby perpetuate the
inefficient use that they strenuously criticize.
38
In practice, therefore, a landowner seeking to transfer conserved water
derived from native supplies, section 1011 notwithstanding, likely must limit the
amount it may transfer to the amount of water it had been consumptively using: a
result which on its face is inconsistent with the espoused purpose of the
conservation statutes. In reality, the decision suggests that section 1011 is not to
34. State v. Riverside County Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 281-82 (Ct. App. 2000); see City of
San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 794 (Cal. 1921)
35. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 599 P.2d 656, 672-
73 (Cal. 1979); Witherill v. Brehm, 240 P. 529, 533 (Cal. 1925); Wright v. Best, 121 P.2d 702, 710-11 (Cal.
1942); Riverside County Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281-82; Schimmel v. Martin, 213 P. 33, 34 (Cal.
1923); see CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, ASSESSOR'S HANDBOOK SECTION 542: ASSESSMENT OF WATER
COMPANIES AND WATER RIGHTS, PART I1, at 5 (Dec. 2000). See generally Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
36. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); see Gregory S. Weber,
Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and Context, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1155 (1995).
37. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949); City of San Fernando v. City of
Los Angeles, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975).
38. Ariz. v. Cal., 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983); Shulz & Weber, supra note 31, at 1064; see FINAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 22-25; Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 656; Stuart L. Somach & Andrew M. Hitchings, Antitrust
Considerations in Water Marketing, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 26 (Fall 1996).
260
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be applied in a manner that overrides the rights of junior users to return flows
from native water. Ignoring, for the moment, the practical problems of utilitarian
reallocation and pitting each water user against every other in an endless process
of litigation to determine relative inter se priority, perhaps the greatest irony is
that those who propose such uncompensated redistribution are supporting
inefficient resource management and have been found to foster the very
uncertainty other unsuitable to conditions in the arid west.
III. WATER TRANSFERS
A. The Approach
A more direct approach to meeting the State's water supply deficit, which
was endorsed by the Governor's Commission, 39 is to seek an increase in the
efficiency of water use and distribution that might be effected through the
removal of barriers to water transfers and increasing incentives and protections
for potential water transferors. In theory, with proper incentives, an existing user
might be enticed to modify its existing water use practices and voluntarily
transfer water from one to another.
Most of the Commission's focus on transferability related to surface water
supplies and, in particular, its desire to address the SWRCB's role in approving
transfers.4n The barriers were identified and in many instances the Legislature
promptly responded with new laws or clarifications of other laws designed to
allow water to be more freely traded. To that end, the Commission recommended
providing greater certainty for water rights in California and several key
additions to the California Water Code.4'
B. Conservation-Based Transfers
Of all the Commission's recommendations, Water Code section 1011 has
been the most noteworthy. Water Code section 1011 states that one holding an
appropriative water right who fails to use a portion of that water, due to
conservation measures, will be deemed to have put that conserved water to
beneficial use.42 The conserved water, or the right to its use, may then be
transferred to another water user.43 This mechanism was recommended by the
39. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 60-62.
40. See generally id. at 62-96; see also Clifford T. Lee, Governor's Commission to Review California
Water Rights Law, The Transfer of Water Rights in California (Staff Paper No. 5, Dec. 1977) (addressing the
transferability of water).
41. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-47.
42. CAL. WATER CODE § 101 l(a) (West Supp. 2005).
43. Id. § 1011(b).
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Governor's Commission, as a foil to the forfeiture doctrine's discouragement of
water conservation.44
Conservation-based transfers continue to hold particular promise because
they avoid further pressure on other available supplies to support the transfer as
would be the case if the transferor merely intends to shift to groundwater.
Moreover, because the conservation activity is designed to make existing uses
more efficient, the subsequent transfer of the saved supplies should not cause
adverse third-party economic impacts. Indeed, the conservation activities can
actually provide an economic stimulus above and beyond the baseline
condition.46
In one of the SWRCB 's more significant decisions in recent years, the
SWRCB addressed exactly what a water transfer pursuant to a section 1011
conservation program would encompass.47 The SWRCB found that, despite the
fact that a water district had engaged in an applicable conservation program
under section 1011 and actually saved more than 18,000 acre-feet, third parties
and the environment were already using the vast majority of the water that had
been conserved.48 Accordingly, the SWRCB limited its approval of the transfer to
approximately ten percent of the conserved amount.4 9
In practice, therefore, a landowner seeking to transfer conserved water
derived from native supplies, section 1011 notwithstanding, likely must limit the
amount it may transfer to the amount of water it had been consumptively using-
a result which on its face is inconsistent with the espoused purpose of the
conservation statutes to provide credit to a water right holder for not using water.
In reality, the decision suggests that section 1011 is not to be applied in a manner
that overrides the rights of junior users to return flows from native water.50
44. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
45. See S.W.R.C.B., Revised Order No. WR 2002-13 (Dec. 20, 2002) [hereinafter SWRCB Revised
Order WR 2002-13]. The SWRCB, in the transfer from Imperial Irrigation District to the San Diego County
Water Authority, found that "[t]he record establishes, however, that the transfer will not result in substantial
injury to any third-party water right holder." Id. at 22.
46. See id. at 75. The SWRCB found that the implementation of conservation measures could result in
the creation of over 700 jobs and an increase in personal income of $25 million dollars per year. Id.
47. See S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 2003-01 (2003) [hereinafter SWRCB Order WR 2003-01] (where
the water right to be transferred may have been forfeited for nonuse).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.2-1017 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005). If engaged in
conservation efforts for many years prior to seeking to effect a transfer, a transferor should be able to expect
that the quantity of water available for transfer will not be diminished. Id. § 1011.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
Another important SWRCB decision reviewing the application of section
1011 suggests that a consumptive use savings that will be transferable under the
Water Code5' may be established in two separate ways. 2 First, conservation
efforts may be identified that will be implemented in the year of the transfer and
the associated consumptive use savings may be calculated accordingly.53 Second,
a historic savings due to water conservation efforts implemented in years prior to
the transfer may be established, which will continue to be implemented in the
year of the transfer.
54
Conservation and transfer of foreign or imported water, however, is subject
to different considerations. Because an importer cannot be compelled to continue
the importation for the benefit of third parties,55 in most cases an importer can
expect to be able to transfer the full amount of water conserved. Presumably, this
same rationale can be applied where water being transferred is held in storage,
and therefore would be beyond the priority call of riparians and appropriators that
hold rights to native supplies.56
Despite the advantages of conveying foreign or imported water, if fish and
wildlife have become dependent on the continuance of return flows, junior uses
that might otherwise be unable to challenge a senior water user's potential
transfer may receive consideration in the SWRCB transfer approval process.5 7 An
example of such consideration can be seen in the transfer between the Imperial
Irrigation District ("liD") and the San Diego County Water Authority ("SDCWA"),
discussed infra, in which the SWRCB exercised extensive scrutiny related to the
effect the transfer might have on. tailwater returns to the Salton Sea.58
51. Id. § 1725.
52. See S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 99-12, at 21-22 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter SWRCB Order WR
99-12]; S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 2000-01, at 14 (Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter SWRCB Order WR 2000-01].
53. SWRCB Order WR 99-12, supra note 52, at 21-22; SWRCB Order WR 2000-01, supra note 52, at 14.
54. SWRCB Order WR 99-12, supra note 52, at 21-22; SWRCB Order WR 2000-01, supra note 52, at
14. In order to obtain an accurate measurement of any consumptive use savings resulting from water
conservation efforts, average consumptive use per acre before implementation of conservation efforts should be
compared to average consumptive use following implementation.
55. See Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 60-62 (Cal. 1939).
56. See SWRCB Order WR 99-12, supra note 52, at 22-27; SWRCB Order WR 2000-01, supra note
52, at 14-15.
57. Such potential examples include an environmental impact under the California Environmental
Quality Act, a potential take of a threatened or endangered species, or an affected fish, wildlife, or other
instream beneficial use. ScoTr S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY 10-10 (2003); see SWRCB
Order WR 99-12, supra note 52, at 22-27; SWRCB Order WR 2000-01, supra note 52, at 14-15.
58. See infra Part IV.C.; SWRCB Revised Order WR 2002-13, supra note 45.
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C. Improved Conditions for a Thriving Market: Increased Certainty
Consistent with prevailing economic theory, the Governor's Commission sought
greater certainty for water rights in California that would foster investment and
greater improvements in efficiency.59 The Commission based its recommendations
on its belief that "a property rights system in water which permits voluntary transfers
encourages the shift in resources from lower-value uses to higher-value uses."
6
Allowing a water right to be "traded" in a market context promotes efficiency, as
water may then be utilized by :those who value it most. A system in which water
rights may not be traded and sold will not produce incentives for one to maintain
such rights, as discussed supra.
The California Supreme Court appeared to immediately get the message. In
the first five years following the issuance of the Governor's Commission Report,
it issued two important decisions that acknowledged certainty as the dominant
public policy underpinning for countenancing the subordination of long-dormant
riparian rights in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System v. SWRCB
6 1
in 1978, and again two years later discrediting the view that prescriptive rights
could be used to curtail the State's plenary power over the appropriation of
surface water in People v. Shirokow.
62
The Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court63 and the Court of Appeal decision in United States v. SWRCB 
64
notwithstanding, there has not been any significant erosion of the protected
character of water rights as species of water rights. In fact, in the twenty-five
years since the issuance of the Governors Commission Report, the Courts have
consistently resolved all doubts as to whether water rights are property under
California Law65 and protected against takings without compensation.
66
59. The need for certainty in rules regarding species of real property has long been acknowledged by
the United States Supreme Court. Justice Brennan once wrote that nowhere is certainty more important than in
the Western water rights allocation systems. See Ariz. v. Cal., 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983); Getches, supra note
15, at 12 (stating that "[tihe great virtue of creating property rights in water-the right to use water is itself
property-is that it can be bought and sold").
60. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 62. "The Application of market forces can be an effective way to
achieve a balance between supply and demand, to facilitate efficiency by disclosing non-competitive and
inefficient water users and to stimulate use of technical and procedural innovations to maximize water use
efficiency." WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 6.
61. 599 P.2d 656, 666 (Cal. 1979) (stating that "uncertainty concerning the rights of water users has
pernicious effects").
62. 605 P.2d 859, 866 (Cal. 1980) (stating that "the board is hindered in its task by any uncertainty as to
the availability of water for appropriation").
63. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
64. 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
65. See, e.g., State v. Riverside County Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 281-82 (Ct. App. 2000)
(water rights are a species of real property); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736 (1950)
(acknowledging that Congress has recognized the property status of water rights vested under California law);
County of San Joaquin v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 285 n. 12 (Ct. App. 1997); United
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Even the implementation of the National Audubon decision has served
primarily to support the SWRCB's efforts to balance the ongoing needs of the
environment and consumptive water uses. Viewed through another lens, the
preferred and widely acknowledged benefit of managing water resources on a
"sustainable use" or "safe yield" basis has long been the hallmark of groundwater
adjudications in California.67 In many ways, National Audubon merely brought
the law of surface water into a closer alignment with groundwater by establishing
a baseline for water availability.
The notion that an appropriator could take water free of any similar responsibility
to an environmental baseline seems anathema to any notion of modem water law and
policy. At its core, the National Audubon case addressed the question of whether water
historically taken by the City of Los Angeles was technically still "available" as
distinguished from the relative priorities of competing users. In the end, the result of the
case was effectively the imposition of a similar responsibility on surface water users
instead of allowing the potentially irreversible degradation of water resources.68 In any
event, in practice, the public trust doctrine has had very little adverse impact on the
general certainty of water rights in Califomia.69
It must be conceded that the Court of Appeal's decision in United States v.
SWRCB is often cited for the proposition that the SWRCB may elect to disregard
traditional priorities when acting in its dual functions of water rights and water
quality administration. While the express language of the opinion may admittedly
authorize some level of adjustment between the relative priority of appropriators
by the SWRCB,7° there have been no further reported decisions that elaborate on
the extent of the SWRCB's duties and discretion in accommodating its dual
water rights and water quality functions or, more importantly, the circumstances
that would warrant ignoring seniority as the basis for establishing priority among
competing appropriators.
Even more recently, purely equitable balancing of interests as a method of
apportioning water among competing groundwater right holders was dealt its
death knell in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency.71 While the SWRCB is
States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (Ct. App. 1986); Schimmel v. Martin, 213 P. 33,
34 (Cal. 1923).
66. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 246 (2003); Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 313 (2001); Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570
(2002); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 963 (1950).
67. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975); City of Pasadena v.
City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949); Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 19 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Ct. App. 1985).
The safe yield limitation includes protection against environmental harm; e.g., salt-water intrusion, water
quality degradation, and subsidence.
68. See Cynthia Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake
Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 547-49 (1995).
69. Weber, supra note 34, at 1238-39; see Koehler, supra note 68, at 556-59.
70. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 189 (Ct. App. 1986).
71. 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
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generally charged with a broader administrative responsibility than an individual
court, other than rules of procedure, the differences between the SWRCB
conducting a general stream adjudication and a court presiding over a com-
prehensive groundwater adjudication are not readily discernable. The SWRCB
does have a responsibility to manage and administer water quality values.
However, a court is not free to disregard public trust resources and its self-
executing duties pursuant to California Constitution, article X, section 2, which
clearly extends to water quality.72 Thus, while the physical solution doctrine and
perhaps other equitable considerations may support reasonable accommodations
among competing claimants, they do not justify imposing material burdens on a
paramount water right holder.73
The progression of the common law represented by these decisions as a
whole is significant because they serve to close a number of doors through which
some potential water buyers had sought to contest the historical basis for
determining rules of water rights priorities.74 If the holders of water rights are
secure against challenges to their fundamental priority, the holders of the junior
water rights, as well as potential trading partners, will be encouraged to make
investments in improved efficiency by senior users so as to enjoy the savings
from conserved water through a water transfer.75
D. Active Regional Trading Continues
Today, water transfers are a common if not preferred method of augmenting
water supplies and meeting needs on a regional or watershed basis.76 Trading of
surface water supplies occurs routinely through transactions that may be
structured as leases, assignments, purchases, or even a trade of stock in a mutual
77water company.
Groundwater trading in adjudicated groundwater basins is also now very
common in Southern California. 8 On the other hand, less trading has been
72. Cal. Const., art. X, § 2.
73. Barstow, 5 P.3d at 869; Allen v. Cal. Water & Tel. Co., 176 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1946); City of Lodi v. E.
Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1936); Trussell v. San Diego, 343 P.2d 65 (1959).
74. Lindgren, supra note 14.
75. Water markets can play an important role in reallocating water to meet changing demands both
among geographical regions and among water users with the same region. Thompson, supra note 19, at 701;
Getches, supra note 15, at 12-13. See also HYMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 245 (stating "[biasically, some
regions receive more rainfall than others or are natural storage basins due to the geology of the landscape").
76. Closer examination reveals active markets. See Thompson, supra note 19, at 676, 722. Notably,
Central Valley Project farmers have traded water within irrigation districts for many years. Water Educ. Found.,
supra note 6, at 17; see also 2000 Annual Transaction Review, Water Strategist, Feb. 2001, at 6; 2001 Annual
Transaction Review, Water Strategist, Feb. 2002, at 7; Annual Transaction Review, Water Strategist, Feb. 2003,
at 10; 2003 Annual Transaction Review, Water Strategist, Feb. 2004, at 10.
77. See WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 4.
78. See Ellen Hanak, Califomia's Water Market By the Numbers, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF
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accomplished in unadjudicated basins because of the higher degree of uncertainty
regarding the relative rights of the various users where overdraft conditions have
prevailed for a number of years. In such areas, there is always the prospect that
the rights of some users may be subordinated to the rights of previously dormant
overlying lands, or if prescription can be proven, limited or benefited by
application of prescriptive rights. Moreover, absent an adjudication, groundwater
that might be claimed by overlying owners is generally not transferable.
Two examples of State administered water transfers exhibit just how
effective transfers can be to address water shortages and with the supply of water
for environmental protection. In 1991, following consecutive years of drought,
the State Water Bank was established, and in that year it purchased the rights to
use over 800,000 acre-feet of water from suppliers willing to sell to entities in
critical need.79 Additionally, the Environmental Water Account, in its first year
of operation, obtained over 250,000 acre-feet of water from transfers, which were
used in order to reduce the entrainment of fish at both state and federal pumping
plants in the Bay/Delta region. 80
If, however, the Commission's primary goal was the development of a robust
statewide water market, this goal has not been achieved.81 Inflated claims to
water, referred to here as "paper water rights," may serve to frustrate the
certainty of water rights proposed to be transferred. But, the most significant
challenge to a more robust water market are: (i) the lack of a comprehensive
statewide policy regarding the utilization of water conveyance and storage
facilities; and (ii) the absence of clear rules to address third-party impacts.
CALIFORNIA, Oct. 2002, at 5; Chino Basin Watermaster, 26th Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2002-03, Draft app.
A, P (Jan. 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); MARK WILDERMUTH, FINAL TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM; EVALUATION OF THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF TRANSFERS PURSUANT TO THE PEACE
AGREEMENT (Sept. 2003) (noting that several hundred thousand acre-feet of groundwater has been leased and
transferred over the last five years); CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, supra note 36, at 5; WATER TRANSFER
WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 5. See generally Lee, supra note 40, at 57-70.
79. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 4; Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. All Persons
Interested in the Matter, No. BC 164076 (Super. Ct. L.A. County Aug. 19, 1997) (Declaration of David N.
Kennedy at Exhibit A: Water Bank Supplies) [hereinafter Kennedy Declaration] (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
80. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 5.
81. Water transfers were expected to increase under the 1992 law, but proposed transfers outside the
CVP service area have not gotten beyond the drawing board because of opposition from other local water users.
Water Educ. Found., supra note 6, at 17; WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 5.
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IV. THE REMAINING IMPEDIMENTS
A. Paper Water Rights
82
The vitality and seniority of a water right is always dependant upon relevant
history of method, manner, location, and purpose of use. No amount of legislation
can or should absolve a water user of its corresponding duty to use water in
accordance with applicable law or to suffer the consequences for its failure.83 Water
users cannot be allowed to place this State's precious water resources into "cold
storage"' without regard to the consequences of their actions.
The insistence of some users in the full recognition or acknowledgement of their
paper claim often frustrates potential buyers and approving agencies. Short of a court
decree in a comprehensive adjudication, there is very little in the way that paper
alone can demonstrate.85 For the buyer, the question is usually whether the seller has
satisfactory use to coincide with the paper title and whether the relative reliability of
the water right subject to transfer is worth the benefit of the bargain. The
combination of the traditional "no injury rule"86 created by the then existing
baseline8 7 and the environmental condition88 make it unlikely that native water in
excess of the right holders' consumptive use can be transferred.89 With a fully
developed market, a seller is forced to accept a more realistic view of their water
right and to price it accordingly.
However stale, inflated and unrecorded claims of junior users can still chill
potential transfers by increasing transaction costs in clearing contingencies and in
forcing a transferor to demonstrate superior title. It only takes a protest of a pending
transfer petition to increase costs and add to the delays in approving transfers. Today,
82. See SWRCB Order WR 99-12, supra note 52; SWRCB Order WR 2000-01, supra note 52; see also
Planning and Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 190-191 (Ct. App. 2000);
Janet C. Neuman & Keith Hirokawa, How Good is an Old Water Right? The Application of Statutory Forfeiture
Provisions to Pre-Code Water Rights, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 1 (2000).
83. Cal. Const. art. X, § 2; People ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Ct.
App. 1976); Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1986).
84. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1989).
85. The value of a water right to a potential purchaser depends on a variety of factors. Jan P. Couter,
Hedonic Estimation Applied to a Water Rights Market, 63 LAND ECON. 259, 262-63 (1987).
86. "'[N]o injury' rules prohibit changes in water use that would harm downstream users by altering
the amount, timing, or quality of the return flow." Thompson, supra note 19, at 703.
87. See generally County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66 (Ct. App.
1999).
88. See generally id.
89. See SWRCB Order WR 99-12, supra note 52; SWRCB Order WR 2000-01, supra note 52; Cal.
Water Code § 1725 (West Supp. 2005); SWRCB Order WR 2003-01, supra note 47 (where the water right to be
transferred may have been forfeited for nonuse); see also Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't of Water
Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 191 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "[tihere is certainly the possibility that local
decision makers are seduced by contractual entitlements and approve projects dependent on water worth little
more than a wish and a prayer").
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however, the primary impediment to realizing the goal of a more robust statewide




There was very little if any acknowledgement expressed by the Commission
of the relationship between the desirability of making water rights more freely
transferable and the ability to convey water to its proposed new point of use.90
Yet once water transfers became a favored public policy, the potential sellers still
faced significant challenges in their efforts to execute a transfer, particularly
those seeking to transfer water out of watershed or out of basin.91
As was the case with other commodities early in the development of
California, monopolies over the means to convey the resource from its point of
origin to the point of use have presented challenges to the emergence of robust
markets.92 Water, like oil or crops in the fields, is worth relatively little if the
seller has little or no ability to bring the commodity to market.93 Thus, while the
Governor's Commission focused its attention on the need to bring certainty to
water rights and to streamline transfer laws to make water available for transfer,
there must be some framework to address the conveyance of transferred water if
something more than intra-watershed or intra-basin transfers were to be
facilitated.
Well before the Governor's Commission had been convened, the issue of
accessing natural conveyance systems had largely been addressed by the State
Legislature9 and the Courts.95 The laws applicable to obtaining access to the use of
stream channels and groundwater basins and the rules governing their use remain
90. The Final Report of the Governor's Commission contains significant discussion of the manner in
which California law could be modified in order to encourage water transfers. However, it does not discuss the
facilitation of transfers or the impediments to the physical transfer of water.
91. Complexity of issues related to the use of state and federal conveyance facilities must be resolved,
and interbasin transfers should be expedited. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 15. See also
HYMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 245 (noting the importance of conveyance facilities to open markets).
92. HYMAN Er AL, supra note 14, at 250. Full protection of "lost sales" is equivalent to denying access to
distribution facilities. ASSEMBLY CoMM1TEE ON WATER, PARKS AND WILDLIFE, TESTIMONY ON SB 506 BY
MAUREEN A. STAPLETON, GENERAL MANAGER, SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AurHORrrY (Aug. 9,1999) (introduced
by Senator Peace) [hereinafter STAPLETON TESTIMONY]. Transportation problems are not a trivial hurdle. Thompson,
supra note 19, at 709 n.143; WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 4; Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. All
Persons Interested in the Matter, No. BC 164076 (Super. Ct. LA. County, Oct 23, 1997) (Declaration of Richard Katz)
[hereinafter Katz Declaration] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
93. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 245.
94. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 7043 -7044, 7075 (West 1992).
95. See Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1939); Dunbar v. Humboldt Bay Mun.
Water Dist., 62 Cal. Rptr. 358 (Ct. App. 1967); Fell v. M. & T., Inc., 166 P.2d 642 (Cal. 1946).
2005 /A Prescription for Fulfilling the Promise of a Robust Water Market
relatively well defined. Accordingly, water trading within a given watershed or
groundwater basin can be substantially easier to complete. 96
Conversely, access to and conveyance through man-made systems has triggered
strong opposition when the facility owner is also a water supplier desiring to
maintain monopoly control over its customer base.97 The introduction of new water
into that water supplier's facility gives rise to a potential loss of the facility owner's
purchased water customers and creates a financial exposure where the owner is
heavily reliant upon those same purchased water revenues to cover its fixed costs and
it refuses to modify its rate structure.
2. Surface Channels
River channels, streams, creeks, and surface bodies of water, if navigable, are
subject to a public right for a potential transferor to make use of the channel to convey
water from one point to another. Specifically, Water Code section 7044 provides
authorization to access the surface channel stating:
No legislative act shall prevent use or enlargement of any natural channel
to convey water appropriated under the laws of this State, where the
channel is designated as the means, or part of the means, of conveying the
water so appropriated.98
Water Code section 7075 then declares the right of any appropriator to reclaim
water once it is introduced into a stream and commingled with native water.99 Thus, by
1952, it was considered "common knowledge" that streams could be used as natural
distribution systems to allow the conveyance of water.l1°
Generally, the legal conditions to access and reclamation were essentially that the
conveying party must not injure vested water right holders.101 Typically, this translated
into the "duty of a commingler" to avoid interference with the quality or quantity of
water that would otherwise be available to the existing water users. A party seeking to
use a stream channel to convey water was free to negotiate their terms of access with
affected landowners. However, there was no legal requirement that the party seeking to
convey water through the available stream channel pay compensation to any of the
riparians by which the conveyed water would pass.1 2
96. Thompson, supra note 19, at 718-19; see also CAL STATE BD. OFEQuALIZATION, supra note 36, at 5.
97. Institutions are the market barriers. Thompson, supra note 19, at 677. In purchasing institutions as
a source of market distortion, wholesale agencies desire to protect their customer base. Id. at 755.
98. CAL. WATER CODE § 7044.
99. Id. § 7075.
100. 20 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 69, 70 (1952).
101. Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner, 223 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1950); Crane v. Stevinson, 54 P.2d 1100
(Cal. 1936).
102. In practice, this means that the party using the conveyance capacity probably has the risk of
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3. Groundwater Basins
Like surface channels, groundwater basins are a public resource 10 3 of great
importance in conveying water that may exist in one location to production in
another. Recognizing the public policy benefits in using the available capacity in a
groundwater basin to convey foreign or developed water, the California Supreme
Court extended the benefits of the use of surface channels to groundwater basins
under similar terms and conditions. 104
Modernly, groundwater basins are routinely used to transport and store
water. 0 5 Where there has been an adjudication of the rights to that basin, the
rules for access and recapture will be well known and may be administered by a
watermaster. 1
06
Access to storage has always been important to structuring a water transfer.
The existence of storage allows willing participants to structure their "puts and
takes" in order to accommodate discrepancies in the water availability and water
demand cycles. In other words, surface water hydrology in a given region may
provide surface run-off at a time when there is insufficient demand to support a
real-time transfer. However, by staggering the period of diversion and the period
of distribution through the use of available storage within a groundwater basin,
the parties may conserve water to meet long-term water supply needs. In so
doing, seasonal or less reliable water supplies may be made "firm."
The legal basis for using groundwater storage to facilitate a transfer is
established by the court decrees in most adjudicated basins. 0 7 In unadjudicated
areas, there are limitations to the use of basin storage capacity grounded in a duty
shortages unless there is a clear basis to demonstrate the amount of water that would otherwise be available in
absence of the conveyance. Thus, even though it is often written that a riparian right does not attach to foreign
or developed water, the burden falls upon the transferring party to demonstrate its reclamation will not cause
harm.
103. See Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal. Water Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495-
96 (Ct. App. 2003).
104. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1943); City of Los Angeles v. City of
San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975).
105. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, 537 P.2d at 1250; Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist., 135
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486; Alameda County Water Dist. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App.
1974).
106. For example, the Chino Basin, in Los Angeles County, is administered by the Chino Basin
Watermaster. See Chino Basin Mun. Water Dist. v. City of Chino, No. RCV 51010 (Super. Ct. San Bernardino
County) (formerly Case No. 164327); WILLIAM A. BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING
GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992); see also CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, supra note 36,
at app. A (Watermasters-Contacts for Water Rights Transfers in Southern California).
107. Pursuant to the Chino Basin Peace Agreement, signed in 2000, the:
Watermaster shall approve the Transfer of water as provided in the [Chino Basin] Judgment
so long as the individual Transfer does not result in any Material Physical Injury to any
party to the Judgment or the Basin. Watermaster may approve a proposed Transfer with
conditions that fully and reasonably mitigate any threatened or potential Material Physical
Injury.
Chino Basin Peace Agreement, at 32 (June 29, 2000) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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to do no harm. Thus, available capacity within a groundwater basin may be used
without compensation to overlying landowners up to the historic high water
levels in the basin under natural conditions. 0 8 This right of storage is qualified,
however, by certain restrictions which protect users of the basin's native waters.
Stored imported water is the first to spill from a full basin and the rejected
recharge could reasonably be charged to the storing party.' °9 Furthermore, one
may not recapture the water in a manner that causes physical harm to overlying
lands." °
The potential for water quality degradation now looms as a larger legal
impediment to the use of groundwater basins to implement water transfers. To the
extent the imported water has different chemical constituents, it may cause problems
for the users of native groundwater that have constructed treatment and distribution
systems in reliance upon the water quality of local supplies. Recent decisions also
suggest that a transferring party may also have obligations to comply with the Clean
Water Act and obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit even though they have added no chemicals to the transferred
water ultimately recharged into a groundwater basin."'
4. Man-Made Facilities
a. Background
While the law regarding the use of natural conveyance systems was well
developed by the time of the Commissions Report in 1978,12 there was little
opportunity for (and perhaps even less law regarding the ability of) a willing
buyer or willing seller to use man-made facilities. The general rule was that the
owner of the facility retained its respective rights to condition the use of its
property when responding to a request to use available capacity, without regard
to whether there was excess capacity in the conveyance system.
Public agencies are immune from regulation by the California Public Utilities
Commission" 3 and, prior to 1986, there was generally no recourse for a member
of the public to contest a decision of a local agency to deny access to public
facilities. Thus, to a large extent the facility owners controlled access to their
own facilities and their decisions were beyond meaningful judicial review.
108. See Niles Sand & Gravel, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 851-53; Victor E. Gleason, Water Projects Go
Underground, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 625 (1975).
109. City of Los Angeles, 537 P.2d at 1250.
110. Los Osos Valley Assoc. v. City of San Luis Obispo, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (Ct. App. 1994).
111. See N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003);
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
112. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
113. County of Inyo v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 604 P.2d 566 (Cal. 1980).
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b. Apportionment and Improvements
At the time of the Commission's Report, the sole exceptions to the general
right of local agencies to deny access to available capacity were found in Water
Code sections 1775 and 1800, respectively. Neither statute was considered by the
Commission.
Control of both these remedies lay within the discretion of the SWRCB. 1 4 Water
Code section 1775 provides that, where there is undeveloped capacity in a physical
facility used to appropriate water under the Water Commission Act, another can
make application to the SWRCB for apportionment of the available capacity so as to
secure the right to complete a new appropriation or presumably a water transfer.
1 5
Section 1775 allows person to apply to the SWRCB for a permit to utilize unused
capacity of works (dams, tunnels, diversion works) when the owner will not or
cannot develop the full capacity of the stream from which it appropriates water.
116
The SWRCB can permit joint occupancy and use, and the applicant under section
1775 must pay a pro rata portion of the total cost of works, as well as maintenance
costs." 7 The statute requires that when determining whether to grant an application
for joint occupancy and use, the SWRCB should take into consideration the
following factors: the reasonable cost of the original and new works; the good faith
of the applicant; the market for water to be supplied by the original and new works;
and the income or use that may be required to provide fair and reasonable returns on
the cost of the works. 118
Similarly, Water Code section 1800 authorizes a party that desires to augment
the facilities owned or controlled by another to apply to the SWRCB for the
authorization to improve the existing facilities." 9 Section 1800 allows a person to
114. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1775, 1800 (West 1971).
115. Id. § 1775. Section 1775 provides:
If at any time it appears to the board, after a hearing of the persons interested and an
investigation, that the full capacity of the works built or constructed, or being built or
constructed, under an appropriation of water made pursuant to the Water Commission Act or
this code has not developed or cannot develop the full capacity of the stream at the point
where the works have been or are being built or constructed, and that the holder of the
appropriation will not or cannot, within a period deemed to be reasonable by the board,
develop the stream at that point to such capacity as the board deems to be required by the
public good, the board may permit the joint occupancy and use, with the holder of the
appropriation, to the extent necessary to develop the stream to its full capacity or to such
portion of its capacity as may appear to the board to be advisable, by any persons applying




118. See id. § 1776.
119. Id. § 1800. Section 1800 provides:
If it appears to the board that the full capacity of the works built or constructed, or being
built or constructed, under an appropriation of water under the Water Commission Act or
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apply to the SWRCB for a permit to repair, improve, or enlarge another's existing
works when those works will not or cannot develop the full capacity of the stream.' 2°
The burden of improvement is solely upon the shoulders of the party desiring the
improvement and they must also assume any subsequent maintenance costs
attributable to their proposed improvements.12 1 The statute requires that, when
determining whether to grant an application for joint occupancy and use, the
SWRCB should consider the public good and should ensure that the repair or
enlargement will not materially interfere with the proper use by the owner of the
works nor materially injure them.' 22 Water Code sections 1775 and 1800 were
originally adopted as part of section 12 of the Water Commission Act.' 23 As with
section 1800, "water works" are only subject to this power of the SWRCB under
section 1775 if they were constructed under an appropriation "made pursuant to the
Water Commission Act" or the Water Code, i.e., since December 19, 1914.124
However, section 12 originally contained two paragraphs.
1l 5
The first paragraph provided that the State Water Commission ("Water
Commission") could impose on appropriators a time limit in which they were
required to apply the full amount of water listed in their application to a beneficial
use.2 6 The second paragraph, which contained what later became sections 1775
and 1800 of the Water Code, provided, in part, that if at any time it appeared to the
Water Commission that an applicant had constructed its water works and yet not
used the full capacity of those works to "develop," i.e., divert water up to, the full
capacity of the stream, and the appropriator "will not or cannot" develop the full
capacity of the stream within a reasonable period of time, then the Water
Commission could permit the joint use and occupancy of those works by any other
party applying to do so.127
this code, will not develop the full capacity of the stream at that point, and that the public
good requires it, and the board specifically so finds after investigation and hearing of the
persons interested, the board may permit any person to repair, improve, add to, supplement,
or enlarge, at his own expense, any works already so built or constructed or in process of
being so built or constructed under the provisions of this division, and to use the works




122. See id. §§ 1800-1801.
123. A review of legislative history materials show that the paragraph that later became sections 1775
and 1800 were added to section 12 of Assembly Bill 642 on May 10, 1913. See 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, sec. 12,
at 1018. Sections 1775 and 1800 have been modified very little since enactment. They were incorporated into
the Water Code basically unchanged in 1943, and amended once in 1957 to change references to the
"commission" to the "board." See 1943 Cal. Stat. ch. 368, sec. 1775, at 1629; 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1932, sec. 128-
131, at 3387. There have been no other amendments to section 1775 since that time.
124. CAL. WATER CODE § 1775.
125. See 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, sec. 12, at 1018.
126. See id. For the modem version of this rule, see CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1395-1398.
127. See 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, sec. 12, at 1018.
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The subsequent applicant could be "any and all persons, firms, associations,
or corporations applying therefor."'' 28 Additionally, it provided that, under the
same circumstances, the Water Commission could permit an applicant to "repair,
improve, add to, supplement, or enlarge, at his or its proper costs, charge and
expense" the works of another constructed under the Act, and to jointly use the
facilities with the owners thereof.
29
The exact nature or form of the application to be filed by the party seeking to
make use of or enlarge existing facilities was not specified in section 12, and has not
been further clarified by the Water Commission or the SWRCB. Consequently, there
remains some uncertainty as to whether the provision refers only to "new applicants"
to appropriate water as described in Water Code section 1260 or a broader definition
of "applicant" that would include prior appropriators requesting a change in their
underlying water right to complete a transfer.
While a cursory review of the statutory language might suggest that these
options were available only to "new applications" to appropriate water, there are at
least three reasons that sections 1775 to 1801 are likely to be available to effectuate a
transfer. First, under the Water Commission Act, the term "application" was used to
denote a filing with the Water Commission for a change in the place of diversion as
well as for a new appropriation. 30 Thus, the terms "application" or "applicant"
should refer equally to either an appropriator seeking to make a change in an existing
right or a new applicant filing to initiate an appropriation of water.
Second, the water policy of the state to promote and facilitate transfers would
be served by the utilization of sections 1775 and 1801 by a party seeking to make
a change under an existing right as much as by a party seeking to make a new
appropriation of water.' 31 It is both economically wasteful and inefficient for a
party seeking to change the point of diversion or the place of use to be forced to
construct completely new facilities rather than avail themselves of the processes
set forth in sections 1775 and 1801.
Third, the SWRCB has plenary power to enforce the provisions of the
California Constitution under Article X, Section 2132 and it has extended its
"public interest" evaluation to other subject matter not expressly articulated
among the relevant criteria in reviewing transfers.133 However, the exact process
that would be used by the SWRCB in determining whether to permit joint use is
unknown. It must involve fair notice and an opportunity to be heard, and it may
include an investigation of facts by the SWRCB. 134 The SWRCB would also be
128. See id.
129. See id
130. See id. sec. 16, at 1021-22.
131. See id. sec. 11, at 1017-18; CAL. CONST., art. X, § 2; CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 1971).
132. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1980).
133. See SWRCB Revised Order WR 2002-13, supra note 45, at 73-77.
134. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1775, 1800 (West 1971).
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required to require California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") compliance
before issuing a permit for enlargement and subsequent joint use. 35
If repair or enlargement is permitted by the SWRCB, the party making
repairs or enlargements must pay for these repairs or enlargements.' 36 If joint use
is permitted by the SWRCB, the subsequent user must pay to the original owner
of the works a pro rata portion of the total cost of any old and new works.1 3 7 The
subsequent user must also pay pro rata operations and maintenance costs incurred
after beginning use or occupancy of the works. 
138
There is little statutory guidance on what constitutes the "pro rata" shares of
the original and subsequent users to be determined by the SWRCB, probably as
part of the application process. 139 If the water is to be used for irrigation or
domestic purposes, the pro rata portion must be based on the proportion of the
water used by the original and subsequent users of the works, although whether
the amount of water used by each party is calculated on an annual or long-term
basis is not specified by the statute. 40 The "pro rata share" would likely equal the
"capacity" right held by each of the parties in the diversion or conveyance works.
If the water is used for the generation of power, the pro rata portion of the
costs is to be based on the relative amount of power capable of being developed
by the original and new works. 141 If a portion of the water is used for a
combination of irrigation and power generation, the applicant is required to pay a
pro rata portion of the total cost of the old and new works based upon the
proportion of the relative amount of water used by each joint occupant and the
income derived by each from the joint occupancy. 142 On the other hand, if the
water is used for purposes other than irrigation, domestic use, or power
generation, the pro rata portion shall be determined by the SWRCB as appears to
be "just and equitable."'143
Not all water facilities are linked to water rights obtained under the Water
Commission Act, thus they are beyond the reach of Water Code sections 1775
and 1800. Furthermore, not every proposed transfer calls for either the use of
permanent capacity within existing facilities or the expenditure of millions of
dollars for the construction of additional ones to convey the water. However,
135. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21065(c) (West 1996).
136. CAL. WATER CODE § 1800.
137. Id. § 1777.
138. Id. § 1782.
139. See id. § 1752. There are no SWRCB precedents for determining the pro rata portion of the cost of
works the applicant is required to pay upon SWRCB approval of an application for joint use. There have been
no reported cases, unpublished cases made available on Westlaw or LEXIS, or decisions by the SWRCB related
to or interpreting Water Code sections 1750 through 1801.
140. See id. § 1778.
141. See id. § 1779.
142. See id. § 1780.
143. See id. § 1781.
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sections 1775 and 1800 present a transferee/transferor, particularly in the case of
a long-term or permanent water transfer, with two options for the conveyance of
the water it is to receive.
c. Space Available
As stated above, sections 1775 and 1800 have never been utilized. And, by
1986, it had become evident that the legislative efforts previously envisioned by
the Governor's Commission had not been sufficient to open up water markets to
the extent anticipated. 144 Water conveyance facility owners had been successful
in blocking voluntary water transfers by refusing access to available capacity in
their canals and aqueducts. 145 Although it had been the State's policy for some time
to encourage water transfers, there was no legislation that set forth a rational process
to determine how canals and conveyance facilities might be used by prospective
transferors.' 46 Consequently, State Assemblyman Richard Katz introduced a bill in
1986 that was designed to remedy this situation by mandating that the owners of
public water systems authorize the use of available capacity of their facilities to
complete transfers. 147
Commonly referred to as the Katz Wheeling Bill, the bill ultimately signed
into law by the Governor reflects an intention of providing opportunities for
willing buyers and sellers of water to secure a right of access to man-made
conveyance systems so long as they paid fair compensation to facility owners.148
The bill sought to require water agencies to make unused capacity available for
water transfers and provide a mechanism by which to determine reasonable
compensation for that capacity's use.149 Contrary to the focus of Water Code
section 1775 on a permanent apportionment of capacity, the Katz law was instead
focused on "space available" use. In other words, as in the case of wheeling
water through natural conveyance systems, the potential transferors were
required to do no harm; they could not displace the water supplies held by the
owner of the facility. 150
The Katz Wheeling Bill provides that where the owner of a water
conveyance system has unused capacity within its system, it must allow others to
use the "water conveyance facilities" to transport water. 151 These facilities are not
144. DEP'T OF WATER RES., ENROLLED BILL REPORT OF AB 2746, at 2-3 (Aug. 29, 1986) (noting that
"[iln some situations the owner has simply refused to allow others to use its facilities"); Katz Declaration, supra
note 92, at 2.
145. Katz Declaration, supra note 92, at 2.
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id. at 3; A.B. 2746, 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 918 (adding sections 1810-1814 to the Water Code).
148. Katz Declaration, supra note 92, at 3; CAL. WATER CODE § 1810-1814.
149. Katz Declaration, supra note 92, at 3; CAL. WATER CODE § 1810.
150. CAL. WATER CODE § 1810.
151. Id.
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limited to aqueducts and canals, but also include local distribution systems.'
52
Should a transferor or transferee of water wish to utilize unused capacity within
such conveyance facilities, the owner of the conveyance facilities must respond
in a "timely manner."'
' 53
Questions regarding the implementation of a transferee's rights under the
Katz Wheeling Bill began to surface in 1996. The MWD and its largest customer,
the SDCWA, were at loggerheads over whether section 1811 (c) allowed MWD
to set "fair compensation" 154 for the use of its facilities on some basis other than
reimbursement for its actual costs incurred in accommodating a proposed transfer
of-Colorado River water from the ID to SDCWA. 55
While SDCWA contended that MWD was obligated to establish charges on a
comparable basis to the method employed by the California Department of Water
Resources ("DWR") 156 on an actual facilities used, or "point to point" basis, MWD
disagreed. 57 Although the express language of the statute strongly suggested that
only those "costs incurred" in accommodating the transfer could be collected from
the potential transferor, 158 MWD contended that it was entitled to exercise reasonable
discretion in setting the rates for such fair compensation and that a system-wide cost
recovery approach was available. 159 In making its argument, it essentially relied upon
the historical discretion traditionally accorded to local agencies in their establishment
of rates and on the language in section 1810 that incorporates the traditional "no-
injury" rule.160
The primary area of disagreement devolved from SDCWA' s unwillingness to
hold MWD harmless against the loss of expected water sales to SDCWA if
SDCWA were to secure an independent water supply for a portion of its water
needs. MWD's "wheeling rates" were established to price the cost of conveyance
at roughly the same price as the cost of water delivered to SDCWA, inclusive of
conveyance. 161
Matters reached a flashpoint in the spring of 1997 and the California
Legislature enacted emergency legislation that appointed the Director of Water
Resources to issue a report on a proper wheeling charge or wheeling fee to be
152. San Luis Coastal Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Morro Bay, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 2000).
153. CAL. WATERCODE § 1812.
154. "'Fair compensation' means the reasonable charges incurred by the owner of the conveyance
system, including capital, operation, maintenance, and replacement costs, increased costs from any necessitated
purchase of supplemental power, and including reasonable credit for any offsetting benefits for the use of the
conveyance system." Id. § 1811 (c).
155. See Metro. Water Dist. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (Ct. App. 2000).
156. Kennedy Declaration, supra note 79, at 8.
157. Metro. Water Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330-31.
158. CAL. WATER CODE § 1811(c).
159. Metro. Water Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331.
160. See id; CAL. WATER CODE § 18 10(d).
161. Metro. Water Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324-26.
278
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applied to the Colorado River Aqueduct in the context of the emerging California
4.4 Plan for the Colorado River.' 62 Litigation also ensued in a validation action
162. CAL. WATER CODE § 1812.5 (repealed 1997). Enacted by SB 1082, section 1 of 1997 Cal. Stat. ch.
874 provided:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(1) This section is an extraordinary measure being taken only because the proposed transfer
of conserved water from the Imperial Irrigation District to the San Diego County Water
Authority is a matter of statewide interest in that it addresses a significant need for water
in the southern state through the conservation of water now being consumed there. The
Legislature further finds and declares that this section is not to be regarded as setting a
precedent for any other legislative action.
(2) California's use of Colorado River water is limited to its basic annual apportionment of
4.4 million acre-feet, plus one-half of any excess or surplus water from the Colorado
River. However, California continues to use up to 5.3 million acre-feet by relying on
surpluses and apportioned, but unused water within the Colorado River Basin, which is
not a reliable water supply. The Secretary of the Interior has strongly urged California to
develop a plan to enable it to live within its basic apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet
from the Colorado River.
(3) It is of vital state interest that every effort be made to ensure that the Colorado River
Aqueduct continues to operate at its full capacity at fair and reasonable terms in order to
minimize statewide disruptions from diminishing Colorado River supplies.
(4) Negotiations assisted by the director are underway in 1997 between the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California and the San Diego County Water Authority for the
development of a long-term wheeling agreement whereby the San Diego County Water
Authority would use the Colorado River Aqueduct to wheel conserved water from the
Imperial Irrigation district.
(b) The director shall assist the Colorado River Board and the six California water agencies
that derive water from the Colorado River in developing a plan to ensure that California
can live within its entitlement of 4.4 million acre-feet of water annually and to ensure that
the needs of southern California for Colorado River water are met.
(c) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with regard to the proposed transfer of
conserved water from the Imperial Irrigation District to the San Diego County Water
Authority, using the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California's water
conveyance facilities, including the Colorado River Aqueduct, if the San Diego County
Water Authority and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California have not
reached an agreement in principle on the terms and conditions of the transfer of
conserved water using the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California's water
conveyance facilities on or before August 15, 1997, the director shall issue a formal
recommendation within 30 days from that date, with regard to the appropriate terms and
conditions of the transfer.
(2) The director, in issuing a recommendation regarding appropriate terms and conditions of
the transfer, shall make those determinations prescribed by Section 1812.
(3) If the director's recommendations prescribed by Section 1812 are unacceptable to either
the San Diego County Water Authority or the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California, that party may request a formal mediation process. If both parties agree to
participate in the formal mediation process, the parties shall commence mediation within
one month after the mediation request is made. If the parties cannot agree on a mediator,
the director shall appoint a mediator or the director may serve as mediator. The San
Diego County Water Authority and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California shall reimburse the state for any General Fund money used in mediation
entered into pursuant to this paragraph.
(d) No action taken pursuant to this section shall injure any legal user of water, and there
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that MWD initiated by seeking judicial support of its wheeling rates in
connection with its annual rate-setting process. 163
A short initial phase of a two phase trial was completed before Laurence Kay
in early 1997 and a decision rendered in January of 1998 invalidated MWD's
efforts to set fair compensation as an advance rate without regard to specific
facilities that were actually used in the effectuating the transfer. 64 An exhaustive
review of the legislative history of the Katz Wheeling Bill and the personal views
of Richard Katz reflects a legislative intention to constrain the discretion of the
local agency in setting its fee for fair compensation. 65 In fact, the bill's author,
Richard Katz, also wrote letters to MWD encouraging it to modify its views to
conform to their early efforts and representations when the bill was adopted.
66
From Assemblyman Katz's perspective, section 1810 pertained to those costs
that were "solely attributable to the facility in question, and solely attributable to
the use of the facility."' 67 In his view, MWD was misinterpreting the law so as to
block the then-proposed HD to SDCWA water transfer.
168
During the first phase of trial, SDCWA had sought to introduce an extensive
package of legislative history regarding the meaning of various provisions of the
bill, including a declaration from Richard Katz and several pieces of
corroborating correspondence between Katz and MWD representatives.
69
shall be no shifting of costs for actions taken pursuant to this section to water users in any
county in the State of California.
(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1999, and as of that date is
repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before January 1, 1999, deletes or
extends that date.
Id.
163. Metro. Water Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
164. Id. at 327-28.
165. See id. at 319-22; Katz Declaration, supra note 92, at 6-13.
166. See Letter from Richard Katz, Assemblyman, to John "Woody" Wodraska, General Manager,
Metropolitan Water District (Nov. 17, 1995) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Letter from
Richard Katz, Assemblyman, to John Foley, Chairman of the Board, Metropolitan Water District (Nov. 1, 1996)
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Letter from Richard Katz, Assemblyman, to N. Gregory Taylor,
General Counsel, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Nov. 26, 1996) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Katz Declaration, supra note 92, at 9-13.
167. Letter from Richard Katz, Assemblyman, to John "Woody" Wodraska, General Manager,
Metropolitan Water District 1 (Nov. 17, 1995) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
168. Letter from Richard Katz, Assemblyman, to John Foley, Chairman of the Board, Metropolitan
Water District 2 (Nov. 1, 1996) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
169. SDCWA presented a declaration of Richard Katz in which he set forth the facts surrounding his
introduction of the Katz Wheeling Bill, as well as his interactions with MWD regarding their differing
interpretations of an appropriate wheeling fee under the statute. See supra note 167; Metro. Water Dist. of S.
Cal. v. All Persons Interested in the Matter, No. BC 164076 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1998) (Defendant
SDCWA's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Declaration of Richard Katz). SDCWA
attempted to have this introduced into evidence based on the California Supreme Court's decision in
Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 649 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1982), in which the Court took judicial
notice of various reports, letters, and legislators' memos dealing with the statutory amendments in the case. See
id.
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Although the trial court ultimately elected to focus on the plain meaning of the
Katz Wheeling Bill rather than legislative history and, in fact, even refused to
accept the Katz declaration into evidence, the trial court ruling concurred with
the position of the multiple defendants in virtually every respect. In summary, the
trial court decision held that "fair compensation" must be set to recover the actual
incremental costs incurred in accommodating a transfer and that the general rate-
making rules did not apply. 170 MWD appealed.
171
While the case remained on appeal, the Director of the DWR was able to
issue his report to the Legislature on the amount of an appropriate wheeling
fee. 172 In late summer of 1998, the issue became temporarily moot when the
Legislature appropriated $235 million for the lining of the All-American Canal as
part of an agreement between SDCWA and MWD, whereby MWD was to
receive substantial offsetting water supply benefits from canal lining in consideration
for agreeing to exchange 200,000 acre-feet of water for SDCWA.
173
Under a contract known as the "Exchange Agreement," MWD agreed to
"exchange" water obtained by SDCWA from HD at a fee within the ranges previously
recommended by Kennedy and that were generally reflective of MWD's "point to
point" costs. 174 However, the Exchange Agreement was carefully drafted to ensure that
MWD would not have to cede the characterization of the conveyance agreement as a
"wheeling contract" and so that it would receive the lion's share of the benefits
from the canal lining.
Though the Katz Wheeling Bill was crafted to cover many important aspects
of water wheeling, as discussed infra, there are issues related to wheeling that
have required judicial interpretation and will likely still require further legislative
clarification. The legislature has unsuccessfully attempted to address some of
these issues on two occasions.
Senator Steve Peace convened a stakeholder group during the summer of
1999 while the MWD validation case remained on appeal. Although the
stakeholders were able to agree upon useful clarifying amendments regarding the
inclusion of storage and treatment facilities and more defined administrative
processes for the timely prosecution of wheeling requests, they were unable to
reach agreement on whether "lost sales" could legitimately be recovered through
an agency's wheeling fee. In addition, methodology for determining a proper
pro-ration of capital costs where firm capacity was to be provided could never be
170. Metro. Water Dist. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 327-28 (Ct. App. 2000).
171. Id. at 317.
172. Pursuant to section 1812.5 of the Water Code, Director of Water Resources David Kennedy issued
a report estimating a two-tiered wheeling fee during variable hydrologic conditions at $80 and $110 per acre-
foot.
173. AGREEMENT FOR TRANSFER OF CONSERVEDWATER BY AND BETWEEN IMPERIAL IRRIGATION
DISTRICT AND SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY (Apr. 29, 1998).
174. Id.
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agreed upon. In 2000, Senator Jim Costa subsequently tried to reconstitute the
stakeholder group, but still no consensus emerged. 1
75
Subsequently, the construction of Water Code section 1810 received judicial
construction and clarification in two California Court of Appeals decisions. In the
first case, San Luis Coastal Unified School Dist. v. City Morro Bay,176 the Second
District Court of Appeal construed the terms "transferor" and "transferee" within the
meaning of section 1810 to 1814.177 In that case, a school district that had previously
purchased water from the city negotiated a less expensive contract with the county. 78
In order to carry out its new contract, however, the District would require a wheeling
agreement to convey the transferred water supply through the city's facilities. 179 The
City-anticipating lost profits from the new arrangement-refused to transport the
water through their conveyance systems.' 80
The District petitioned for and was denied a writ of mandate to compel the
conveyance from the trial court.' 81 According to the lower court, section 1810
allowed only "transferors" of water to demand use of the City's conveyance system
and the school district was a "transferee."' 182 However, on review, the Court of
Appeal reversed, construing the meaning of "transferor" to include both buyers and
sellers of transferred water. 83 This construction was based on the court's recognition
that, because the purchase and sale of water are inexorably linked, one cannot exist
without the other.' 84 Further, the court clarified that "transferor" refers, not to sellers,
but to "an entity that transfers water from one place to another. ' 85 As such, the
District was a transferor within the meaning of section 1810 and the City could not
deny it the use of the water conveyance facility with unused capacity. 1
86
The Morro Bay opinion also addressed the appropriate definition of the
Wheeling Statute's term conveyance "facilities.' ' 87 Although the City offered a
narrow definition limited to canals and aqueducts, the Court of Appeals determined
that "facilities" referred to not only canals and aqueducts but also local distribution
facilities and allowed for the incidental storage and treatment required to complete
the transfer.
188
175. See S.B. 621 (2002) (as amended in the Assembly on Aug. 28, 2002).
176. 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 2000).
177. Id. at 325.
178. Id.
179. Id.






186. Id. at 328.
187. Id. at 327.
188. Id.
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Finally, and even more definitively, the Court of Appeals rejected the City's
claim that the school district's proposed use of its facilities for the sole purpose
of reducing the cost of their water supply amounted to an impermissible "injury"
under Water Code section 1810(d). 189 The City argued that the statute required
that water transfers "promote efficient use of water" and that the District's use
was intended to save money, not to conserve water.190 In interpreting section
1810(d), the court disagreed and found that nothing prevented a party from using
it for the sole purpose of reducing costs. 191 Because lost sales were not the type of
injury the statute protected, the District was entitled to transport water through
the City's conveyance system. 92 Said the Court:
But we do not believe the loss of income from a customer is the sort of
injury to a legal user of water the Legislature had in mind. Neither Morro
Bay nor its water customers have the right to make the school district
purchase any particular amount of water. Although loss of a customer
can cause financial difficulties, it does not amount to an injury. 193
The Katz Wheeling Bill was also addressed by a different Division within the
Second Appellate District, however, with a directly conflicting result., 94 The
Appellate Court heard the case on appeal from the Laurence Kay opinion,
mentioned earlier, in which the trial court invalidated as a "matter of law" the
MWD's practice of fixing wheeling rates in advance based on the volume of
water transported and including system-wide costs without regard to the actual
costs incurred in wheeling the water. 195
On appeal, as they had done successfully in the trial court, the respondents
argued that any damages arising from lost sales were unrecoverable under the
Katz Wheeling Bill and that the statutes required that the fees for wheeling
services be linked to the actual costs incurred by MWD in transporting the
water. 96 The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court, however, declaring
that the Legislature would have expressly provided that it wanted to preclude the
use of a system-wide methodology to protect against potential lost sales, if it had
intended to do SO. 197 The court also rejected the defendant's argument that MWD
189. Id. at 328.
190. Id. at 327.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 328 (referring to Water Code section 1810, the court stated that nothing in the statutory
scheme gave the city the right to deny the school district the use of its water conveyance system because it
wanted more money).
193. Id.
194. Metro. Water Dist. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (Ct. App. 2000).
195. Id. at 316.
196. Id. at 330-31. The defendants argued that a wheeling charge for a particular transaction must be
calculated with respect to point-to-point use of the facilities and system-wide costs should not be included. Id.
197. Id. at 333.
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was required to set rates on a case-by-case basis. 98 Because the Katz Wheeling
Bill requires timely rate setting, the Court of Appeal held MWD's fixed rate
practice effectuated, rather than violated, the statute's purpose. 199 Additionally,
contrary to the conclusion reached in the Morro Bay case, the Metropolitan Court
held that the owner of conveyance facilities could, as 'part of its wheeling charge,
recover for lost sales stating:
There is no indication the Legislature ever intended that the water
conveyance system owner should suffer potential or actual financial loss
as a result. Rather, the Legislature took repeated steps to enact
compensatory language that would enable water conveyance system
owners to provide the desired wheeling service while recovering their
costs. In short, the Legislature did not intend that the impact of the
Wheeling Statutes should be to cause a water conveyance system owner
to lose money or to subsidize wheeling transfers.2 °°
The Metropolitan and Morro Bay opinions clearly conflict regarding whether
the Wheeling Bill allows the recovery of costs associated with lost sales. The
Metropolitan opinion additionally allows for an abstract rate to be set in advance
of a transfer.2 °1 On both of these points, the cases appear to be inconsistent.
Viewed from a policy perspective, the result in the Morro Bay case clearly
seems to be more in line with both California law and with the recommendations
of the Governor's Commission to facilitate transfers. If, under California law,
water is to be put to reasonable use,202 and it is the policy of the State to promote
transfers,20 3 the Katz Wheeling Bill cannot be read in a fashion that would allow
the owner of conveyance facilities to set its wheeling charge for unused capacity
in such a fashion as to create a barrier to the effectuation of a water transfer. State
law and policy demand that, although a facility owner receives fair compensation
for the utilization of facilities, 4 the facility owner not be allowed to prevent
water transfers based on a desire to preserve its own market position. At a
minimum, the existing conflict between the opinions in Morro Bay and
Metropolitan creates one more element of the uncertainty that leads to inefficient
water resource utilization and must be resolved.
198. Id. at 335.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 336.
202. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
203. CAL. WATER CODE § 109 (West Supp. 2005).
204. Id. § 1810-1814.
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d. Looking Ahead: Potential Wheeling Issues
A central issue in the consideration of future wheeling is the cost that must
be paid to the owner of the conveyance facilities as "fair compensation." The
problems with the approach adopted in Metropolitan are numerous.
Like other owners of water conveyance systems, MvD's desire to protect its
position in the marketplace and control its largest customer is obvious and
understandable. 20 5 But why should Californians' accept the inherent conflict that
is implicit in a situation where the owner of the conveyance system is also the
supplier of water to a party seeking to execute a transfer?
With regard to wheeling, it has been observed that "[w]e do not allow United
Airlines to own airports," and the monopoly power associated with "wheeling" of
any underlying commodity," whether the commodity is "water aqueducts,
electricity, natural gas, or telecommunications," must be undertaken by an
enterprise that is neutral to the cost and terms of the transaction."
20 6
Transportation problems related to the conveyance of water are not a trivial
hurdle.20 7 Access to pumping plants in the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta and
canal capacities are major factors in accomplishing water transfers from the
northern portions of the Central and Southern areas of California.20 8 If potential
transferors cannot pay the costs of securing wheeling rights through facilities
owned by public agencies, inter-basin transfers are likely doomed for any parties
other than the facility owners. There does remain some hope, as not all facility
owners are as protectionist as MWD. Kern County has long assessed merely an
incremental cost methodology. It can do this largely because, unlike MWD, it has
instituted a rate structure that allows it to recover its fixed costs without regard to
the volumetric sales of its water.
209
205. See HYMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 250 (stating that SDCWA's purchase of liD's conserved
water "would represent one of the first cracks in the MWD's monopoly"); Somach & Hitchings, supra note 38,
at 26 (noting that "certain regulatory agencies sometimes act in dual roles within the transfer process");
STAPLETON TESTIMONY, supra note 92; Cf ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON WATER, PARKS AND WILDLIFE,
TESTIMONY ON SB 506 BY GERALD A. GEwE, ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR WATER, L.A. DEP'T OF
WATER & POWER (Aug. 9, 1999) (introduced by Senator Peace).
206. Robert Fellmeth, Plunging into Darkness: Energy Deregulation Collides With Scarcity, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 823, 862 (2002).
207. Thompson, supra note 19, at 709 n.143.
208. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 15, at 4. The only mention of the subject was in a
footnote in the introduction.
209. See RICHARD E. Howrrr ET AL, INTEGRATED ECONOMIC ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S
FUTURE WATER SUPPLY 72 (Aug. 1999) (CALVIN report); U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INTERIM GUIDELINES
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WATER TRANSFER PROVISIONS OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT IMPROVEMENT
ACT, DRAFT (rev. Feb. 19, 1993); U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECLAMATION MANUAL DIRECTIVES AND
STANDARDS WTR 04-01: USE OF EXCESS CAPACrrY IN RECLAMATION PROJECTS FOR THE IMPOUNDMENT,
STORAGE, AND CARRIAGE OF NoN-PROIECr WATER (Nov. 2000) (supplementing and providing implementation
guidelines for the Reclamation Manual policy WTR P04). Both of the State's major export projects, the State Water
Project ("SWP") and the Central Valley Project ("CVP"), take differing approaches to wheeling costs for use of
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Assuming that the financial challenges could be overcome, there is still a
matter of water quality that will have to be addressed. Just as in the case with
differences in the quality of water conveyed through natural conveyance systems,
facility owners may use water quality concerns as justification for their decision
to further increase the cost of access, or deny it entirely.
Water Code section 1810 states that:
The commingling of transferred water does not result in a diminution of
the beneficial uses or quality of the water in the facility, except that the
transferor may, at the transferor's own expense, provide for treatment to
prevent the diminution, and the transferred water is of substantially the
same quality as the water in the facility.21°
While 1810 suggests that a transferor may elect to pay for the additional
treatment costs, what constitutes "diminution" is unclear. Does any change in
water quality or in the concentration of each constituent, such as total dissolved
solids, or a contaminant such as chromium, constitute diminution? The
legislature or the courts will likely have to answer this question if open access to
man-made systems is to be obtained.
e. Anti-Competitive Conduct
Section 1 of the Sherman Act expressly precludes anti-competitive monopolies
and collusion that restrain competition.1 Section 2 prohibits predatory and anti-
212
competitive conduct through the acquisition of monopoly power.
To establish a colorable claim, generally a plaintiff must prove that the
213
conduct has a "not insubstantial effect" on interstate commerce. The restraint
must injure competition in the relevant market. 1
MWD owns and controls the major regional water supply and distribution
systems throughout its service area. It owns and controls the only water conveyance
their facilities. For contractor-to-contractor transfers, the SWP charges only for the power necessary for
conveyance. However, the SWP is not as generous to non-contractors interested in wheeling through SWP
facilities, and they must pay pro-rated capital charges but still on a "point-to-point" basis with charges to non-
contractors also covering capital costs as well as incremental charges based on reach used. Additionally, non-
contractors must supply the power necessary for conveyance or pay a non-contractor power rate. The U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, in connection with its oversight of the CVP, charges wheeling of non-CVP water by requiring the
transferor to pay for necessary power and withholding any benefits of incidental power generation from their water.
However, excess capacity in CVP facilities may only be used for water that will be put to use for irrigation and
drought control purposes. See Kennedy Declaration, supra note 79, at 7.
210. CAL. WATER CODE § 1810(b) (West Supp. 2005).
211. 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West Supp. 2005).
212. Id. §2.
213. Pinhas v. Summit Health Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 1989), aftd, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
214. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof l Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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facilities that connect many of its member agency customers to the rest of Southern
California and the balance of the MWD service area.
When it adopts an all-inclusive set of wheeling and conveyance charges, that
when combined, approach or equal the price of water it sells to its customers,
there is little if no opportunity for a potential buyer or seller to secure water from
a supplier other than Metropolitan at a competitive price.215
The Sherman Act does not apply to anticompetitive restraints imposed by the
States "as an act of government. ''21 6 Thus, when an entity that owns essential
water conveyance facilities and at the same time is seeking to maintain its market
share, the question arises as to whether the public agency that is acting in an anti-
competitive manner can be held responsible.21 7 A government entity may gain
"Parker immunity" from the Sherman Act provisions if state policy authorizing
restraints on competition is a foreseeable result of the grant of regulatory
authority to such an entity.21 8 If it is the declared policy of the State to facilitate
water transfers and California Constitution Article X, Section 2 mandates the
reasonable use of water, then it would appear that a local agency that sought to
establish barrier pricing to access common carrier facilities might have some
responsibility under the Sherman Act. However, given the federal case law view
that California countenances the anti-competitive conduct, antitrust concerns do
not seem to have had an effect.
The applicability of the Sherman Act antitrust provision arose in the water
content case of Kern-Tulare Water District v. City of Bakersfield,219 where the
City of Bakersfield refused to consent to the Kern-Tulare Water District's transfer
of water provided to the District under contract with the City. 220 Although the
215. Mark P. Berkman & Jesse David, Water Wars: Part II: Water Subsidies in Southern California:
Do They Exist and Have They Contributed to Urban Sprawl? A Comment on an Article by Steven P. Erie and
Pascale Joassart-Marcelli Titled "Unraveling Southern California's Water/Growth Nexus: Metropolitan Water
District Policies and Subsidies for Suburban Development, 1928-1996, 37 CAL. W. L. REv. 121 (2000).
216. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). The Court explained that the Sherman Act was meant
to apply to the actions of individuals, not to state actions: "The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as
such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id. at
351.
217. Gary D. Weatherford, Liquid Transfers, THE RECORDER, Jan. 11, 1994, at 7 (noting that
"[pirotective barriers restraining trade in California are primarily public affairs").
218. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 828 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1015 (1982); see also Hedgecock v. Blackwell Land Co., 1995 WL 161649 (9th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished disposition).
219. 828 F.2d at 514.
220. Id. at 516.
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plaintiff prevailed at trial, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court's determination that, in refusing to consent to such a transfer, the
City had lost its Parker immunity, as its actions had resulted in the waste of
water, in contravention to the California policies favoring efficient use and free
transfer of water.221 The Court found that it was the State of California's policy to
"displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal control over water
and water rights, so long as the municipality does not engage in waste or
unreasonable use. 222 When viewed in light of such a policy, the Court found that
the City's refusal to consent to the District's attempted transfer was an action
contemplated by the legislature in its grant to the City of the ability to acquire
water rights for the provision of water to its -inhabitants, and to dispose of any
223surplus water.
The Court reasoned that, in empowering municipalities to acquire, purvey,
and dispose of water, the Legislature must have contemplated, that in the exercise
of those power, "cities might act by contract to preserve access to water for
existing and future uses.,,224 A city's ability to do so was found to be protected so
long as the city did not engage in waste or unreasonable use.225 The Court found
that the City's refusal to allow the District to transfer unneeded water did not
constitute such waste or unreasonable use.226
The Court's broad extension of Parker immunity to municipalities wishing to
maintain a secure water supply amounts to the express allowance of barriers to
water transfers.2 27 Apparently not wasteful or unreasonable, the Court's decision
stands for the proposition that a municipality may impose barriers to the type of
efficient water use that the Governor's Commission wished to promote. On the
other hand, some have argued that the Kern-Tulare decision may not be the last
word. 228 A rationale that supports governmental immunity to foster prudent
governmental regulation can hardly be squared with a water supplier's efforts to
restrict competition by foreclosing access to essential water conveyance facilities.
221. Id. at 519.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 519-20.
224. Id. at 520.
225. Id.
226. Id. The Court found the oversight of the SWRCB regarding the waste and unreasonable use of
water to be a sufficient safeguard to protect against "the likelihood that a city will be able to waste or
unreasonably use water before another potential user can avail itself of recourse." Id. at 521.
227. Weathefford, supra note 217.
228. Somach & Hitchings, supra note 38, at 26 (stating that "[w]hile the Kem-Tulare case is important
for its analysis of California's and other western states' pervasive regulation of water rights and water use, the
case is probably most significant for the limits of its holding").
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C. Non-Traditional Third Party Impacts
The issue of whether those persons that indirectly benefit from an existing
water diversion and use may have a legal status to protest or block a transfer is an
open question. So-called "non-traditional" third-party rights have been the
subject of law review commentary, 229 some legislative acknowledgement, 230 and
even a screenplay. 231 The SWRCB approval process is designed to ensure that the
public interest and third-party rights are not impaired by the transfer.
Traditionally, however, a party that did not have a legally recognized interest in
the water supply to be transferred generally has no standing to object to a water
transfer.232 However, the public interest is always an important consideration in
SWRCB determinations, and modem standing before the SWRCB has been more
liberal.233 While the public interest review of the SWRCB is often equated with
ensuring the protection of fish, wildlife, and the environment, there is no
requirement that the SWRCB limit its review to these issues.234
In the context of the Imperial Transfer decision, a conservation transfer, the
issue arose as to the benefits and impacts associated with specific methods of
conservation.235 It was alleged that different forms of conservation would cause
different benefits and impacts, and the impacts that were thought to potentially
result from a specific choice juxtaposed the concerns of non-traditional third
parties against fish, wildlife and recreation.236
The essence of the dispute in Imperial Transfer was that non-traditional
interests opposed land fallowing as a specific means of conservation, because it
was alleged that this method of conservation would cause socio-economic
impacts within the surrounding community.237 On the other hand, because fish
and wildlife might be adversely impacted by a reduction in return flows
associated with on-farm conservation focusing on irrigation efficiency, fallowing
229. See George Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1,
20-21 (1988); Charles Howe, Protecting Public Values in a Water Market Setting: Improving Water Markets to
Increase Economic Efficiency and Equity, 3 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 357, 372 (2003); Hanak & Dyckman,
supra note 17, at 491-92; Aaron Ralph, Drain the Water and Pull the Plug on the Economy at One Community
So that Another Community Can Brim Over with Economic Development: Is it Any of the SWRCB's Business?,
34 MCGEORGE L. REv. 903, 918-21 (2003).
230. See S.B. 479 (2003) (as introduced on Feb. 20, 2003, but not enacted). Introduced by Senator Mike
Machado, SB 479 would have authorized the SWRCB to approve petition for long-term water transfers only if
it additionally determines that the proposed transfer would not cause substantial, negative third party impacts.
231. THE MILAGRO BEANFtELD WAR (Universal Pictures 1988) (based on the book by John Nichols).
232. Vineland Irrigation Dist. v. Azusa Irrigating Co., 58 P. 1057, 1060 (Cal. 1899).
233. CAL. WATER CODE § 1702 (West 1971); see S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 95-09, at 29 (June 22,
1995) [hereinafter SWRCB Order WR 95-09].
234. CAL. WATER CODE § 1702; SWRCB Order WR 95-09, supra note 235, at 29.
235. See SWRCB Revised Order WR 2002-13, supra note 45.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 73-77.
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was also considered as a more environmentally benign method to generate
conserved water for long-term transfer.238
Several SWRCB rulings are of special interest. First, the SWRCB concluded that
the community's interest did not constitute that' of a "legal user" of water, but
nevertheless held that the nontraditional third-party rights could be considered by the
SWRCB in its public interest balancing.239 The SWRCB so held based on its
conclusion that its public interest review of long-term transfers was comparable to
that involved in approving an initial application to appropriate.2 Accordingly, the
SWRCB determined that it could consider the socio-economic impacts of fallowing
on the personal incomes of employees and business owners within Imperial
County.241 The SWRCB held that:
The SWRCB has authority to consider whether the transfer would be in the
public interest in view of the potential socio-economic impacts of fallowing.
In evaluating proposed changes in a water right permit or license, including
changes that will allow a transfer to take place, the SWRCB considers the
same factors that it considers when evaluating a water right application,
including whether the changes will be in the public interest.242
In support of this position, the SWRCB cited to several sections of the Water
Code governing its consideration of general applications to appropriate water.
243
In reaching its decision, the SWRCB rejected the SDCWA's contention that there
was no legal basis for the SWRCB's consideration of socio-economic impacts
because the Water Code provisions governing long-term transfers 244 did not
expressly provide for an evaluation of whether a long-term change would be in
the public interest.245 Instead, the SWRCB concluded that the language of Water
Code section 1736 extended the SWRCB's discretion, similar to that present
when it approves an amendment in a permit or license.246 In the swRcB's view,
neither the Water Code nor public policy supported a statutory construction
precluding the SWRCB from considering the public interest (or in this case the
socio-economic effects of fallowing) as part of its review of a change petition
"when the SWRCB would be required to consider the public interest if the
change had been proposed as part of the original application.,
247
238. Id.
239. Id. at 21-23, 73-74.
240. Id. at 73-74.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 74; see CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1256 (West 1971).
244. CAL. WATER CODE § 1726.
245. SWRCB Revised Order WR 2002-13, supra note 45, at 74 n.21.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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The SWRCB ultimately concluded that it might be feasible to minimize the
potential economic effects and to mitigate those that could not be eliminated and
found that the transfer would be in the public interest, notwithstanding the
potential socio-economic effects that fallowing might produce because those
effects should be minimized and mitigated.248
Instrumental to its finding was Senate Bill 482,2A9 which provided a process by
which any socio-economic impacts of the transfer would be evaluated and mitigated. 250
In summary, the bill required the Resources Agency and the Technology, Trade and
Commerce Agency to submit to the Legislature a report prepared in consultation
with both lID and Imperial County evaluating the nature and extent of economic
impacts of fallowing in the County associated with the transfer, measures taken by
IID to minimize such impacts, and the extent to which funds in excess of the funds
received by liD for water transferred might be necessary to mitigate such impacts.251
The SWRCB was satisfied that this procedure would address the potential socio-
economic impacts of the transfer and reserve continuing jurisdiction pending the
outcome of the Agencies' report to consider whether additional measures were
necessary to minimize or mitigate such impacts.252 Accordingly, the SWRCB
effectively accepted the surrogate for the authority it deemed itself to possess.
However, the lack of guidance regarding the process or outcome in situations where
there is no express legislative authorization or SWRCB surrogate has added a
significant element of uncertainty for those seeking long-term water transfers.253
In approving the lID Transfer, the SWRCB concluded that it possessed the
power to condition a transfer on the basis that it had the authority to so condition
the initial appropriation of water. Yet, in no case has the SWRCB ever assigned a
financial requirement of mitigating financial impacts on the area in which water
originates. Perhaps this is so because the law effectively embeds a preservation
of local values through the State's adoption of the dual system of riparian and
appropriative rights in the Lux v. Haggin254 decision. Given that the export of
248. Id. at 74.
249. 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 617.
250. SWRCB Revised Order WR 2002-13, supra note 45, at 74.
251. Id. at 77.
252. Id.
253. See Ralph, supra note 231, at 918 (stating that "[n]ot only does the SWRCB fail to state what
standard of review is used to determine whether the socio-economic impacts are sufficiently minimal to approve
the transfer, but it does not even define the term 'socio-economic impact"').
254. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886). The opinion states:
In our opinion, it does not require a prophetic vision to anticipate that the adoption of the rule,
so called, of "appropriation" would result in time in a monopoly of all the waters of the state
by comparatively few individuals, or combinations of individuals controlling aggregated
capital, who could either apply the water to purposes useful to themselves, or sell it to those
from whom they had taken it away, as well as to others. Whether the fact that the power of
fixing rates would be in the supervisors, etc., would be a sufficient guaranty against over-
charges would remain to be tested by experience. Whatever the rule laid down, a monopoly or
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water for appropriative use must always be subordinate to the local riparian and
overlying water requirements, there is likely to always be a reservation of some
water for local needs. With that said, there is still no instance in which the
SWRCB has imposed a financial barrier in the form of community compensation
to address the local economic impacts associated with the appropriation of water.
Even CEQA does not require the analysis of purely economic impacts.
The SWRCB, though undertaking a detailed approval process, has never
imposed an economic mitigation fee to offset perceived socio-economic impacts
of an appropriation. This includes its approval processes for large appropriations
of water to be used outside the county, area, and even watershed where the water
to be appropriated originates. For example, the SWRCB has approved large-scale
water appropriations for use in both the State Water Project ("SWP") and the
federally operated Central Valley Project ("CVP"). However, the SWRCB has
not considered the socio-economic impacts on the area of origin of allowing
water originating in one location to be utilized elsewhere. It is at least worth
observing that if there is a valid public interest concern .regarding the impacts of a
transfer on an area that has long been allowed to reap the benefits of imported
water, then there must be exposure for any appropriator that has removed water
from a watershed in any case where the SWRCB has maintained continuing
jurisdiction over the license or the permit.
A potential water transferee, seeking to most economically supplement its
existing water supply, is now faced with the uncertainty surrounding the
possibility that the SWRCB may require mitigation of the potential socio-
economic impacts of a transfer. But, though the SWRCB has declared itself to
have the power to do so, in the BiD to SDCWA transfer discussed supra, the
SWRCB deferred to State agencies to analyze the socio-economic impacts and
refrained from clarifying what additional costs a prospective transferee must now
consider in its contemplation of a water transfer. Further questions abound.
What is the duty and role of the local agency seeking to transfer water to
account for socio-economic impacts? What is the role of the local city or county?
Who should be the arbiter of the proper course of conduct and appropriate level
of mitigation where the views of one or more local agencies conflict? What is the
standard for measurement? Does a transferor get a credit or reimbursement for
third parties when it creates economic stimulus through a conservation-based
transfer? In the absence of further clarification,255 the potential transaction costs
associated with any given transfer are difficult, if not impossible to predict and
the exposure to this uncertain and potentially unquantifiable duty will have a
chilling effect on future transfers.
concentration of the waters in a few hands may occur in the future.
Id. at 703.
255. See Ralph, supra note 231.
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V. CONCLUSION
Subject to some limited exceptions, the Legislature and the courts have
combined to provide greater certainty and security to water rights in California. The
statutory addition of Water Code section 1011 holds great promise for parties seeking
to transfer water so long as the conservation-based transfers are generally within the
historic consumptive use of the transferor, as they are likely to result in fewer socio-
economic impacts. However, if California desires a more robust water market, one
that can truly be a powerful tool in meeting our mounting water supply deficits,
further reform will be required.
Whether the ultimate responsibility for further reform will' lie within the
Legislature or the courts is unclear. However, specific improvements in two discrete
areas should help.
First, with regard to wheeling, further articulation of the basis for establishing
"fair compensation" under the Wheeling Statutes is essential. A state legislative
declaration that otherwise anti-competitive municipal conduct in blocking third-party
transfers is not anticipated, condoned, or acceptable state policy may serve to change
the result under the only federal case to consider the subject and discourage a facility
owner from blocking transfers in an effort to keep its customers captive.
As an alternative, the Legislature could consider removing the responsibility for
establishing "fair compensation" for wheeling from the owner of the conveyance
system and vesting that authority in an independent entity. The facility owner has an
inherent conflict of interest in setting the fee for fair compensation where the owner's
customer is the party requesting a transfer. The SWRCB wields a similar and
independent responsibility under Water Code sections 1775 to 1801, and it should be
well positioned to implement the provisions of Water Code section 1810.
Second, the subject of socio-economic impacts must be addressed through the
articulation of a standard that defines the scope and measure of a transferor's
obligation to mitigate socio-economic impacts. A water transferor seeking to
understand whether a specific contemplated transfer will trigger indirect "non-
traditional" third-party impacts and to what degree they will be responsible for
mitigation may find very few satisfactory answers. It is difficult to argue that some
members of a community may be harmed but, on the other hand others may be
benefited. Moreover, the imposition of an arbitrary standard that fixes a mitigation
fee without regard to the form of conservation employed and whether there are
actually positive socioeconomic impacts that result from the transfer is unwise and
will only serve to discourage rather than promote transfers. If public policy demands
that socio-economic impacts be addressed, then California needs a clearly defined
standard, which provides for a credible measurement of socio-economic effects, so
that potential transferors will be able to realistically gauge the transaction costs
triggered by a proposed trade.
Without these or other similar measures that address these issues, the 50-year
anniversary of the Commission's Report will likely find us with only limited and
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decidedly local water markets. For some, this will be the realization of a vision to
curtail California's economic expansion or to force yet further conservation efforts.
For others, it will be yet one more failed effort to augment future water supply needs
that serves as the rationale to build new and bigger water supply projects. But for
most Californians, it will only spell a collective failure to secure a future consistent
with sustainable management and development of our State's precious water
resources in an economically efficient and environmentally responsible way.
